| 66. QUOD PER RATIONALEM MENTEM MAXIME ACCEDATUR AD COGNOSCENDUM SUMMAM ESSENTIAM.
| 66. Through the rational mind one comes nearest to knowing the Supreme Being.
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| Cum igitur pateat quia nihil de hac natura possit percipi per suam proprietatem sed per aliud, certum est quia per illud magis ad eius cognitionem acceditur, quod illi magis per similitudinem propinquat. Quidquid enim inter creata constat illi esse similius, id necesse est esse natura praestantius. Quapropter id et per maiorem similitudinem plus ivuat mentem indagantem summae veritati propinquare, et per excellentiorem creatam essentiam plus docet, quid de creante mens ipsa debeat aestimare. Procul dubio itaque tanto altius creatrix essentia cognoscitur, quanto per s propinquiorem sibi creaturam indagatur. Nam quod omnis essentia, in quantum est, in tantum sit summae similis essentiae, ratio iam supra considerata dubitare non permittit.
| Since it is clear, then, that nothing can be ascertained concerning this Nature in terms of its own peculiar character, but only in terms of something else, it is certain that a nearer approach toward knowledge of it is made through that which approaches it more nearly through likeness. For the more like to it anything among created beings is proved to be, the more excellent must that created being be by nature. Hence, this being, through its greater likeness, assists the investigating mind in the approach to supreme Truth; and through its more excellent created essence, teaches the more correctly what opinion the mind itself ought to form regarding the Creator. So, undoubtedly, a greater knowledge of the creative Being is attained, the more nearly the creature through which the investigation is made approaches that Being. For that every being, in so far as it exists, is like the supreme Being, reasons already considered do not permit us to doubt.
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| Patet itaque quia, sicut sola est mens rationalis inter omnes creaturas, quae ad eius investigationem assurgere valeat, ita nihilominus eadem sola est, per quam maxime ipsamet ad eiusdem inventionem proficere queat. Nam iam cognitum est, quia haec illi maxime per naturalis essentiae propinquat similitudinem. Quid igitur apertius quam quia mens rationalis quanto studiosius ad se discendum intendit, tanto efficacius ad illius cognitionem ascendit; et quanto seipsam intueri negligit, tanto ab eius speculatione descendit?
| It is evident, then, that as the rational mind alone, among all created beings, is capable of rising to the investigation of this Being, so it is not the less this same rational mind alone, through which the mind itself can most successfully achieve the discovery of this same Being. For it has already been acknowledged that this approaches it most nearly, through likeness of natural essence. What is more obvious, then, than that the more earnestly the rational mind devotes itself to learning its own nature, the more effectively does it rise to the knowledge of that Being; and the more carelessly it contemplates itself, the farther does it descend from the contemplation of that Being?
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| 67. QUOD MENS IPSA SPECULUM EIUS ET IMAGO EIUS SIT.
| 67. The mind is the mirror and image of the Supreme Being.
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| Aptissime igitur ipsa sibimet esse velut "speculum" dici potest, in quo speculetur ut ita dicam imaginem eius, quam "facie ad faciem" uidere /78/ nequit. Nam si mens ipsa sola ex omnibus quae facta sunt, sui memor et intelligens et amans esse potest: non video cur negetur esse in illa vera imago illius essentiae, quae per sui memoriam et intelligentiam et amorem in trinitate ineffabili consistit. Aut certe inde verius esse illius se probat imaginem, quia illius potest esse memor, illam intelligere et amare. In quo enim maior est et illi similior, in eo verior illius esse imago cognoscitur.
| Therefore, the mind may most fitly be said to be its own mirror wherein it contemplates, so to speak, the image of what it cannot see face to face. For, if the mind itself alone among all created beings is capable of remembering and conceiving of and loving itself, I do not see why it should be denied that it is the true image of that being which, through its memory and intelligence and love, is united in an ineffable Trinity. Or, at any rate, it proves itself to be the more truly the image of that Being by its power of remembering, conceiving of, and loving, that Being. For, the greater and the more like that Being it is, the more truly it is recognised to be its image.
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| Omnino autem cogitari non potest rationali creaturae naturaliter esse datum ali quid tam praecipuum tamque simile summae sapientiae, quam hoc guia potest reminisci et intelligere et amare id, quod optimum et maximum est omnium. Nihil igitur aliud est inditum alicui creaturae, quod sic praeferat imaginem creatoris.
| But, it is utterly inconceivable that any rational creature can have been naturally endowed with any power so excellent and so like the supreme Wisdom as this power of remembering, and conceiving of, and loving, the best and greatest of all beings. Hence, no faculty has been bestowed on any creature that is so truly the image of the Creator.
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| 68. QUOD RATIONALIS CREATURA AD AMANDUM ILLAM FACTA SIT.
| 68. The rational creature was made for loving the Supreme Being.
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| Consequi itaque videtur quia rationalis creatura nihil tantum debet studere, quam hanc imaginem sibi per naturalem potentiam impressam per uoluntarium effectum exprimere. Etenim praeter hoc quia creanti se debet hoc ipsum quod est: hinc quoque quia nil tam praecipoum posse quam reminisci et intelligere et amare summum bonum cognoscitur, nimirum nihil tam praecipue debere velle convincitur.
| It seems to follow, then, that the rational creature ought to devote itself to nothing so earnestly as to the expression, through voluntary performance, of this image which is impressed on it through a natural potency. For, not only does it owe its very existence to its creator; but the fact that it is known to have no power so important as that of remembering, and conceiving of, and loving, the supreme good, proves that it ought to wish nothing else so especially.
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| Quis enim neget quaecumque meliora sunt in potestate, ea magis esse debere in uoluntate? Denique rationali naturae non est aliud esse rationalem, quam posse discernere iustum a non iusto, verum a non vero, bonum a non bono, magis bonum a minus bono. Hoc autem posse omnino inutile illi est et superuacuum, nisi quod discernit amet aut reprobet secundum verae discretionis iudicium.
| For who can deny that whatever within the scope one’s power is better, ought to prevail with the will? For, to the rational nature rationality is the same with the ability to distinguish the just from the not-just, the true from the not-true, the good from the not-good, the greater good from the lesser; but this power is altogether useless to it, and superfluous, unless what it distinguishes it loves or condemns, in accordance with the judgment of true discernment.
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| Hinc itaque satis patenter uidetur omne rationale ad hoc existere, ut sicut ratione discretionis aliquid magis vel minus bonum /79/ sive non bonum indicat, ita magis uel minus id amet aut respuat.
| From this, then, it seems clear enough that every rational being exists for this purpose, that according as, on the grounds of discernment, it judges a thing to be more or less good, or not good, so it may love that thing in greater or less degree, or reject it.
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| Nihil igitur apertius quam rationalem creaturam ad hoc esse factam, ut summam essentiam amet super omnia bona, sicut ipsa est summum bonum; immo ut nihil amet nisi illam aut propter illam, quia illa est bona per se, et nihil aliud est bonum nisi per illam.
| It is, therefore, most obvious that the rational creature was created for this purpose, that it might love the supreme Being above all other goods, as this Being is itself the supreme good; nay, that it might love nothing except it, unless because of it; since that Being is good through itself, and nothing else is good except through it.
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| Amare autem eam nequit, nisi eius reminisci et eam studuerit intelligere. Clarum ergo est rationalem creaturam totum suum posse et velle ad memorandum et intelligendum et amandum summum bonum impendere debere, ad quod ipsum esse suum se cognoscit habere.
| But the rational being cannot love this Being, unless it has devoted itself to remembering and conceiving of it. It is clear, then, that the rational creature ought to devote its whole ability and will to remembering, and conceiving of, and loving, the supreme good, for which end it recognises that it has its very existence.
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| 69. QUOD ANIMA SEMPER ILLAM AMANS ALIQUANDO VERE BEATE VIVAT.
| 69. The soul that always loves the Supreme Being lives at some time in true happiness.
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| Dubium autem non est humanam animam esse rationalem creaturam. Ergo necesse est eam esse factam ad hoc, ut amet summam essentiam. Necesse est igitur eam esse factam aut ad hoc ut sine fine amet, aut ad hoc ut aliquando vel sponte vel violenter hunc amorem amittat.
| But there is no doubt that the human soul is a rational creature. Hence, it must have been created for this end, that it might love the supreme Being. It must, therefore, have been created either for this end, that it might love that Being eternally; or for this, that at some time it might either voluntarily, or by violence, lose this love.
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| Sed nefas est aestimare summam sapientiam ad hoc eam fecisse, ut aliquando tantum bonum aut contemnat, aut volens tenere aliqua violentia perdat. Restat igitur eam esse factam ad hoc, ut sine fine amet summam essentiam.
| But it is impious to suppose that the supreme Wisdom created it for this end, that at some time, either it should despise so great a good, or, though wishing to keep it, should lose it by some violence. We infer, then, that it was created for this end, that it might love the supreme Being eternally.
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| At hoc facere non potest, nisi semper vivat. Sic igitur est facta ut semper vivat, si semper velit facere ad quod facta est.
| But this it cannot do unless it lives forever. It was so created, then, that it lives forever, if it forever wills to do that for which it was created.
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| Deinde inconveniens nimis est summe bono summeque sapienti et omnipotenti creatori, ut quod fecit esse ad se amandum, id faciat non esse, quamdiu vere amaverit; et quod sponte dedit non amanti ut semper amaret, id auferat vel auferri permittat amanti, ut ex necessitate non amet; praesertim cum dubitari nullatenus debeat, quod ipse omnem naturam se vere amantem amet. Quare manifestum est humanae animae numquam auferri suam vitam, si semper studeat amare summam vitam.
| Hence, it is most incompatible with the nature of the supremely good, supremely wise, and omnipotent Creator, that what he has made to exist that it might love him, he should make not to exist, so long as it truly loves him; and that what he voluntarily gave to a non-loving being that it might ever love, he should take away, or permit to be taken away, from the loving being, so that necessarily it should not love; especially since it should by no means be doubted that he himself loves every nature that loves him. Hence, it is manifest that the human soul is never deprived of its life, if it forever devotes itself to loving the supreme life.
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| Qualiter ergo vivet? Quid enim magnum est longa vita, nisi sit a molestiarum incursione vere secura? Quisquis enim dum vivit aut timendo /80/ aut patiendo molestiis subiacet aut falsa securitate fallitur: quid nisi misere vivit? Si quis autem ab iis liber vivit, beate vivit. Sed absurdissimum est ut aliqua natura semper amando illum qui est summe bonus et omnipotens, semper misere vivat. Liquet igitur humanam animam huiusmodi esse, ut si seruet id ad quod est, aliquando vere secura ab ipsa morte et omni alia molestia beate vivat.
| How, then, shall it live? For is long life so important a matter, if it is not secure from the invasion of troubles? For whoever, while he lives, is either through fear or through actual suffering subject to troubles, or is deceived by a false security, does he not live in misery? But, if any one lives in freedom from these troubles, he lives in blessedness. But it is most absurd to suppose that any nature that forever loves him, who is supremely good and omnipotent, forever lives in misery. So, it is plain, that the human soul is of such a character that, if it diligently observes that end for which it exists, it at some time lives in blessedness, truly secure from death itself and from every other trouble.
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| 70. QUOD ILLA SE AMANTI SEIPSAM RETRIBUET.
| 70. The Supreme Being gives itself as a reward to [the soul] which loves it.
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| Denique nullatenus verum videri potest, ut iustissimus et potentissimus nihil retribuat amanti se perseueranter, cui non amanti tribuit essentiam ut amans esse posset. Si enim nihil retribuit amanti, non discernit iustissimus inter amantem et contemnentem id quod summe amari debet; nec amat amantem se; aut non prodest ab illo amari. Quae omnia ab illo dissonant. Retribuit igitur omni se amare perseveranti.
| Therefore it cannot be made to appear true that he who is most just and most powerful makes no return to the being that loves him perseveringly, to which although it neither existed nor loved him, he gave existence that it might be able to be a loving being. For, if he makes no return to the loving soul, the most just does not distinguish between the soul that loves, and the soul that despises what ought to be supremely loved, nor does he love the soul that loves him; or else it does not avail to be loved by him; all of which suppositions are inconsistent with his nature; hence he does make a return to every soul that perseveres in loving him.
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| Quid autem retribuit? Si nihilo dedit rationalem essentiam ut amans esset: quid dabit amanti si amare non cesset? Si tam grande est quod amori famulatur: quam grande est quod amori recompensatur? Et si tale est amoris fulcimentum: quale est amoris emolumentum? Nam si rationalis creatura, quae sibi inutilis est sine hoc amore, sic eminet in omnibus creaturis: utique nihil potest esse praemium huius amoris, nisi quod supereminet in omnibus naturis.
| But what is this return? For, if he gave to what was nothing, a rational being, that it might be a loving soul, what shall he give to the loving soul, if it does not cease to love? If what waits upon love is so great, how great is the recompense given to love? And if the sustainer of love is such as we declare, of what character is the profit? For, if the rational creature, which is useless to itself without this love, is with it preeminent among all creatures, assuredly nothing can be the reward of love except what is preeminent among all natures.
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| Etenim idem ipsum bonum quod sic se amari exigit, non minus se ab amante desiderari cogit.
| For this same good, which demands such love toward itself, also requires that it be desired by the loving soul.
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| Nam quis sic amet iustitiam, veritatem, beatitudinem, incorruptibilitatem, ut iis frui non appetat? Quid ergo summa bonitas retribuet amanti et desideranti se, nisi seipsam? Nam quidquid aliud tribuat, non retribuit, quia nec compensatur amori nec consolatur amantem nec satiat desiderantem.
| For, who can love justice, truth, blessedness, incorruptibility, in such a way as not to wish to enjoy them? What return, then, shall the supreme Goodness make to the being that loves and desires it, except itself? For, whatever else it grants, it does not give in return, since all such bestowals neither compensate the love, nor console the loving being, nor satisfy the soul that desires this supreme Being.
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| Aut si se vult amari et desiderari, ut aliud retribuat: non se uuIt amari et desiderari propter se sed propter aliud, et sic non se vult amari sed aliod; quod cogitare nefas est.
| Or, if it wishes to be loved and desired, so as to make some other return than its love, it wishes to be loved and desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of another; and does not wish to be loved itself, but wishes another to be loved; which it is impious to suppose.
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| Nihil ergo verius, quam quod omnis anima rationalis, si quemadmodum debet studeat amando desiderare summam beatitudinem, aliquando illam ad fruendum percipiat. Ut quod "nunc" videt /81/ quasi "per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc" videat "facie ad faciem". Utrum autem ea sine fine fruatur, dubitare stultissimum est, quoniam illa fruens nec timore torqueri poterit nec fallaci securitate decipi, nec eius indigentiam iam experta illam poterit non amare; nec illa deseret amantem se; nec aliquid erit potentius quod eas separet inuitas. Quare quaecumque anima summa beatitudine semel frui coeperit, aeterne beata erit.
| So, it is most true that every rational soul, if, as it should, it earnestly devotes itself through love to longing for supreme blessedness, shall at some time receive that blessedness to enjoy, that what it now sees as through a glass and in a riddle, it may then see face to face. But it is most foolish to doubt whether it enjoys that blessedness eternally; since, in the enjoyment of that blessedness, it will be impossible to turn the soul aside by any fear, or to deceive it by false security; nor, having once experienced the need of that blessedness, will it be able not to love it; nor will that blessedness desert the soul that loves it; nor shall there be anything powerful enough to separate them against their will. Hence, the soul that has once begun to enjoy supreme Blessedness will be eternally blessed.
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| 71. QUOD ILLAM CONTEMNENS AETERNE MISERA SIT.
| 71. [The soul] that despises the Supreme Being will be eternally unhappy.
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| Hinc utique consequenter colligitur, quod illa quae summi boni amorem contemnit, aeternam miseriam incurrat. Nam si dicitur quod pro tali contemptu sic iustius puniatur, ut ipsum esse vel vitam perdat, quia se non utitur ad id ad quod facta est: nullatenus hoc admittit ratio, ut post tantam culpam pro poena recipiat esse, quod erat ante omnem culpam.
| From this it may be inferred, as a certain consequence, that the soul which despises the love of the supreme good will incur eternal misery. It might be said that it would be justly punished for such contempt if it lost existence or life, since it does not employ itself to the end for which it was created. But reason in no wise admits such a belief, namely, that after such great guilt it is condemned to be what it was before all its guilt.
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| Quippe antequam esset, nec culpam habere nec poenam sentire poterat. Si ergo anima contemnens id ad quod facta est, sic moritur, ut nihil sentiat aut ut omnino nihil sit: similiter se habebit et in maxima culpa et sine omni culpa, nec discernet summe sapiens iustitia inter id quod nullum bonum potest et nullum malum vult, et id quod maximum bonum potest et maximum malum vult.
| For, before it existed, it could neither be guilty nor feel a penalty. If, then, the soul despising that end for which it was created, dies so as to feel nothing, or so as to be nothing at all, its condition will be the same when in the greatest guilt and when without all guilt; and the supremely wise Justice will not distinguish between what is capable of no good and wills no evil, and what is capable of the greatest good and wills the greatest evil.
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| At hoc satis patet, quam inconveniens sit. Nihil igitur videri potest consequentius et nihil credi debet certius, quam hominis animam sic esse factam, ut si contemnat amare summam essentiam, /82/ aeternam patiatur miseriam. Ut sicut amans aeterno gaudebit praemio, ita contemnens aeterna poena doleat. Et sicut illa sentiet immutabilem sufficientiam, ita ista sentiat inconsolabilem indigentiam.
| But it is plain enough that this is a contradiction. Therefore, nothing can be more logical, and nothing ought to be believed more confidently than that the soul of man is so constituted that, if it scorns loving the supreme Being, it suffers eternal misery; that just as the loving soul shall rejoice in an eternal reward, so the soul despising that Being shall suffer eternal punishment; and as the former shall feel an immutable sufficiency, so the latter shall feel an inconsolable need.
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| 72. QUOD OMNIS HUMANA ANIMA SIT IMMORTALIS.
| 72. Every human soul is immortal.
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| Sed nec amantem animam necesse est aeterne beatam esse nec contemnentem miseram, si sit mortalis. Sive igitur amet sive contemnat id ad quod amandum creata est: necesse est eam immortalem esse. Si autem aliquae sunt animae rationales, quae nec amantes nec contemnentes iudicandae sint -- sicut videntur esse animae infantum --: quid de iis sentiendum est? Sunt mortales an immortales? Sed procul dubio omnes humanae animae eiusdem naturae sunt. Quare quoniam constat quasdami esse immortales, necesse est omnem humanam animam esse immortalem.
| But if the soul is mortal, of course the loving soul is not eternally blessed, nor the soul that scorns this Being eternally miserable. Whether, therefore, it loves or scorns that for the love of which it was created, it must be immortal. But if there are some rational souls which are to be judged as neither loving nor scorning, such as the souls of infants seem to be, what opinion shall be held regarding these? Are they mortal or immortal? But undoubtedly all human souls are of the same nature. Hence, since it is established that some are immortal, every human soul must be immortal.
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| 73. QUOD AUT SEMPER MISERA AUT ALIQUANDO VERE BEATA SIT.
| 73. [The soul] is either always unhappy or else at some time truly happy.
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| Verum cum omne quod vivit aut numquam aut aliquando sit vere securum ab omni molestia, nihilominus est necesse omnem humanam animam aut semper miseram esse aut aliquando vere beatam.
| But since every living being is either never, or at some time, truly secure from all trouble; necessarily, also, every human soul is either ever miserable, or at some time truly blessed.
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| 74. QUOD NULLA ANIMA INIUSTE PRIVETUR SUMMO BONO; ET QUOD OMNINO AD IPSUM NITENDUM SIT.
| 74. No soul is unjustly deprived of the Supreme Good. [The soul] is supposed to strive for the Supreme Good wholeheartedly.
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| Quae vero animae incunctanter iudicandae sint sic tes id ad quod amandum factae sunt ut illo quandoque frui, quae autem sic contemnentes /83/ ut illo semper indigere mereantur, aut qualiter quove merito illae quae nec amantes nec contemnentes dici posse uidentur, ad beatitudinem aeternam miseriamue distribnantur: aliquem mortalium disputando posse comprehendere, procul dubio aut difficillimum aut impossibile existimo. Quod tamen a summe iusto summeque bono creatore rerum nulla eo bono ad quod facta est iniuste privetur, certissime est tenendum; et ad idem ipsum bonum est omni homini toto corde, tote anima, tote mente amando et desiderando nitendum.
| But, which souls are unhesitatingly to be judged as so loving that for the love of which they were created, that they deserve to enjoy it at some time, and which as so scorning it, that they deserve ever to stand in need of it; or how and on what ground those which it seems impossible to call either loving or scorning are assigned to either eternal blessedness or misery,—of all this I think it certainly most difficult or even impossible for any mortal to reach an understanding through discussion. But that no being is unjustly deprived by the supremely great and supremely good Creator of that good for which it was created, we ought most assuredly to believe. And toward this good every man ought to strive, by loving and desiring it with all his heart, and all his soul, and all his mind.
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| 75. QUOD SUMMA ESSENTIA SIT SPERANDA.
| 75. We are to hope for the Supreme Being.
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| Sed in hac intentione humane anima nullatenus se poterit exercere, si desperet quo intendit se posse pervenire. Quapropter, quantum illi est utile studium annitendi, tantum necessaria est spes pertingendi.
| But the human soul will by no means be able to train itself in this purpose, if it despairs of being able to reach what it aims at. Hence, devotion to effort is not more profitable to it than hope of attainment is necessary.
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| 76. QUOD CREDENDUM SIT IN ILLAM.
| 76. We are to believe in the Supreme Being.
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| Amare autem aut sperare non potest, quod non credit. Expedit itaque eidem humanae animae summam essentiam et ea sine quibus illa amari non potest credere, ut illa credendo tendat in illam. Quod idem apte breviusque significari posse puto, si pro eo, quod est credendo tendere in summam essentiam, dicatur credere in summam essentiam.
| But what does not believe cannot love or hope. It is, therefore, profitable to this human soul to believe the supreme Being and those things without which that Being cannot be loved, that, by believing, the soul may reach out for it. And this truth can be more briefly and fitly indicated, I think, if instead of saying, "strive for” the supreme Being, we say, "believe in” the supreme Being.
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| Nam si quis dicat se credere in illam, satis videtur ostendere et per fidem quam profitetur ad summam se tendere essentiam, et illa se credere quae ad hanc pertinent intentionem. Nam non videtur credere in illam sive qui credit quod ad tendendum in illam non pertinet, sive qui per hoc quod credit non ad illam tendit. Et fortasse indifferenter dici potest credere in illam et ad illam, sicut pro eodem accipi potest credendo tendere in illam et ad illam, nisi quia quisquis tendendo ad illam peruenerit, non extra illam remanebit sed intra illam permanebit; quod expressius et familiarius significatur, si dicitur tendendum esse in illam, /84/ quam si dicitur ad illam.
| For, if one says that he believes in it, he apparently shows clearly enough both that, through the faith which he professes, he strives for the supreme Being, and that he believes those things which are proper to this aim. For it seems that either he who does not believe what is proper to striving for that Being, or he who does not strive for that Being, through what he believes, does not believe in it. And, perhaps, it is indifferent whether we say, "believe in it,” or "direct belief to it,” just as by believing to strive for it and toward it are the same, except that whoever shall have come to it by striving for (tendendo in) it, will not remain without, but within it. And this is indicated more distinctly and familiarly if we say, "striving for” (in) it, than if we say, "toward” (ad) it.
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| Hac itaque ratione puto congruentius posse dici credendum esse in illam quam ad illam.
| On this ground, therefore, I think it may more fitly be said that we should believe in it, than that we should direct belief to it.
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| 77. QUOD IN PATREM ET FILIUM ET EORUM SPIRITUM PARITER ET IN SINGULOS ET SIMUL IN TRES CREDENDUM SIT.
| 77. We ought to believe equally in the Father, the Son, and their Spirit—in each distinctly and in all three together.
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| Credendum igitur est pariter in patrem et filium et eorum spiritum, et in singulos et simul in tres; quia et singulus pater et singulus filius et singulus eorum spiritus est summa essentia; et simul pater et filius cum suo spiritu sunt una eademque summa essentia, in quam solam omnis homo debet credere, quia est solus finis quem in omni cogitatu actuque suo per amorem debet intendere. Unde manifestum est quia sicut in illam tendere nisi credat illam nullus potest, ita illam credere nisi tendat in illam nulli prodest.
| We should believe, then, equally in the Father and in the Son and in their Spirit, and in each separately, and in the three at once, since the Father separately, and the Son separately, and their Spirit separately is the supreme Being, and at once Father and Son with their Spirit are one and the same supreme Being, in which alone every man ought to believe; because it is the sole end which in every thought and act he ought to strive for. Hence, it is manifest that as none is able to strive for that Being, except he believe in it; so to believe it avails none, except he strive for it.
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